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RELIGION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

By Alexander Mirescu
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Department of Political Science at New School University in New York,
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Dual-Masters from Bowling Green State University/Universitaet
Salzburg-Austria in Comparative Politics and German Language and
Culture. He spent several months working, researching and traveling
throughout Romania, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Croatia.

Introduction

This article explores how the two largest religious factions in the former Yugoslavia, Roman
Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, achieved ethno-religious congruency in the wake of state
disintegration. The crucial question to this theme is how did religious elites influence ethnic identity
formation?
Although the contentious issue of nationalism has received considerable attention since the
dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s, the complex relationship between religion and the
process of nationalist identity formation has yet to be sufficiently scrutinized. Many observers outside
the Balkan arena have frequently characterized the period of Yugoslav disintegration as the outcome
of a power struggle between megalomaniacal actors. Others saw the wars as primordially linked to
violent chapters of history. This perspective, adopted most visibly by the international media,
relentlessly claimed that Serb-Croat enmities were rooted in ancient ethnic hatreds, overlooking or
underplaying long periods of peaceful coexistence.1 Still other, less-primitive factors such as the
rapidly failing economy of the 1980’s, post-communist social developments in Eastern Europe, or
geopolitical constraints on the region have been equally ignored many academics. I am interested in
the complex relationship between religion and the process of nationalist identity formation during
period of social upheaval.
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Lexington Books 2000), 3.
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The simultaneous declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 signaled the
initial phase of complete disintegration from a centralized, multi-ethnic state in five politically
independent entities (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and the remaining Yugoslav Federation).2 Religion played an insignificant role at the
outset of the secessionist conflicts, which first pitted Slovenia’s territorial defense units against the
numerically superior Yugoslav People’s Army or JNA. Religious difference, however, rapidly became
a contributing element as the conflict spread to Croatia and Bosnia. Misha Glenny observed that:
the wars increasingly assimilated the characteristics of religious struggle, defined
by three great European faiths-Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam,
the confessional detritus of the empires whose frontiers collided in Bosnia. 3
Despite the exceptionally high number of inter-religious marriages, an ethnic delineation along lines of
faith was continuously being applied whether the parties in conflict formally practiced one or not. In
contrast to many other ethnic conflicts, historical and contemporary religious beliefs and experience
tend to shape ethnicity and identity in the Balkans far more than in many other parts of the world. 4
What contributions did religion make in shaping identity in the turbulent last decade?
Detailed analyses of Yugoslav society reveal that religion presents the clearest cultural
5

marker. This does not to suggest that the conflict was exclusively of a religious or civilizational
nature.6 On the contrary, Yugoslav society under Communist rule had experienced extended periods of
broad-based secularization across the confessional spectrum. Nevertheless, as racial, linguistic or class
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At the time of this writing, Serbia and Montenegro still formed the ‘rump’ Yugoslav federation or
FRY. Since the election of Milo Djukanovic on 20 October 1997, his party, Pobjeda je Crna Gora
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During the Titoist period the Slovenian and Macedonian languages were constitutionally recognized,
although linguistically distinct from the larger Serbo-Croatian group which covers present-day Bosnia,
Croatia and Yugoslavia. In these cases, one could claim that language would be a significant cultural
marker. Despite nationalist rhetoric, linguistics generally agree that similar variants spoken in Croatia,
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differences were not stable foundations for ethnicity construction, religious affiliation became by
default the only discernable characteristic among the warring parties. Members of the church hierarchy
of Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs recognized a window of opportunity at an early stage to create
a more congruent identity. Distinctive religious groups in modern times have often developed into
ethnically self-conscious communities, but it has also often happened, particularly in Eastern Europe
and in South Asia, that religious differences have been used or even created to establish or emphasize
barriers.7
Religion was effectively manipulated as a cultural marker and mobilized as a standard for
ethnic exclusion of other groups with little regard to the fragile multi-ethnic tapestry. Leaders of the
three monotheistic confessions of Yugoslavia (for this project, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy) all
engaged in effusively distributing nationalist rhetoric with little as to other’s interpretation. As will be
noted later, such blatant lack of sensitivity for other’s historical experiences reinforced old stereotypes
and exacerbated current nationalist identity formation.

Necessary Conditions
Before any process of ethno-religious identification can be initiated, certain social settings
conducive to such development must be available. The existence of favorable conditions in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s drastically increased the possibility of religiously motivated identity
formation. I recognize three pronounced characteristics, which influenced the social and ecumenical
environment in Yugoslavia. Firstly, massive social, economic or military upheaval is necessary for any
initial development of nationalist movements. Ethnic communities are created and transformed by
particular elites in modernizing, post-industrial societies undergoing dramatic social changes.8 The
former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe all experienced different forms of severe social
transformations ranging from the internal breakdown of social and economic structures (Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary) to violent and/or ethnic conflict (Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia). This
process invariably involves competition for political power and economic and social benefits between
competing elites, both within and among different ethnic categories.9 Similar to political elites’
struggle to consolidate power, religious leaders must also engage in competition to solidify their own
power base.
Secondly, the process of intensifying the subjective meanings of a multiplicity of symbols and
of striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence among a group of people defined initially by one or
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more central symbols becomes apparent.10 Ethnic demands center around a central symbol, such as
religion, language or territory.11 As confessional affiliation was the most recognizable marker in the
former-Yugoslavia, both Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox leaders strove to mobilize religion as the
central symbol.
Lastly, efforts must be undertaken to produce greater internal unification. This is achieved by
elites who increasingly stress the variety of ways in which the members of the group are similar to each
other and collectively different from others, this process of identifying the other effectively sets into
motion exclusionary identity formation.12 Necessary for this development are nationalist adherents to
persuade or coerce group members to change their language, religion, behavior or dress.13
This study examines the process by which Catholic and Orthodox elites profited from such an
environment and implemented these tools to promote a congruent, centralized ethno-religious identity.
THE CHURCH’S CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONALIST IDENTITY FORMATION
This section will investigate how religion was symbolically employed as a factor for ethnic
congruence and how nationalist identity was achieved along these lines. This section begins with a
brief overview of the role of religion and secularization during Tito’s communist regime. It is followed
by a diametrical overview of the historical and modern factors, which made the rise of ethnonationalism in the two religious communities possible.

Secularization in Communist Yugoslavia
Research conducted by Yugoslav analysts in the 1960’s and 1970’s observed a striking trend
toward secularization.14 In relative terms, religious belief appeared less intense among the traditionally
Orthodox segments of the population (Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians) than in Roman Catholic
areas such as Slovenia and Croatia or among the Islamic population of Bosnia. 15 However, despite
regional variations, the trend indicated a marked decline in the identification and practice of all
religious activities. Indeed, a country-wide survey of adults revealed that in the fifteen years after the
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first census in 1953, the number of citizens expressing religious belief had plummeted to less than half
of the population, while atheists, non-religious respondents and those indifferent to religion had
collectively undergone a five-fold increase.16 It therefore became less difficult for Marshall Tito to
promote his style of Socialist self-management and the unitary, inclusive model of Yugoslav
multiethnic Bratstvo i jedinstvo (Brotherhood and Unity).
However, as the Communist regime began to encounter serious economic, political and interethnic problems during the twilight of Tito’s rule and the first half-decade of the post-Tito period,
Yugoslav analysts began to identify new tendencies toward the slowing and possible reversal of the
secularization process.17 The failures of economic policy from 1979 to 1985 contributed at least
indirectly toward religious revitalization; in this period net personal income per worker fell by 26%,
foreign debt stood at 18 billion US Dollars and massive waste of foreign loans in less productive or
unprofitable investments in the poorest regions, chiefly Kosovo and Macedonia, made repayment very
difficult.18 Additionally, the end of Tito’s personal control and the mushrooming of internal conflicts
concerning the accumulated problems of the one-party regime partially accounted for a major shift in
public attitudes regarding religion.19
A 1985 survey of 6,500 people demonstrated an increased in religious belief; most notably in
traditionally Catholic and Muslim regions of the country: 62.3% of Catholic families said they were
religious, as compared with 43.8% from Muslim families and 26.2% from Orthodox families. 20
Another countrywide study of citizens employed in the social sector indicated that the trend toward
enhanced religiosity might actually be stronger among younger people than among the older
generation.21 The younger Yugoslav generation increasingly found itself unable to identify with Tito’s
central-minded ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ and thus began to search for more representative ethnic
definitions.
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As the economic and social woes after Tito’s death in 1980 continued, members of different
communities gradually lost confidence in the federation’s legitimacy. The decrease of authority was
characterized by a shift of political power from the federal, centralized system to the republic level;
this transfer was constitutionally guaranteed by several amendments, most notably, in 1974.22 David
Brown accurately summarizes such a political malaise: the inability of state elites to fulfill their
developmental promises translates into the erosion of its main legitimatory ideology. 23 This forces
disillusioned citizens to become more receptive to new social justice claims by aspiring political elites
who depict ethnicity as the alternative imagined kinship community.24 The rising desecularization,
combined with constitutional decentralization, massive social and economic decline and the erosion of
state legitimacy allowed Yugoslav religious elites, profiting from a vast social vacuum, to create more
ethnically-congruent identities.
By 1990, the problems seemed irresolvable. In January of the same year representatives of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) from the eight republics assembled in Belgrade for the
last time in an extraordinary Party congress.25 The debate was mainly centered on the independenceminded Slovene Communists versus the Serb Communists supporting a centralized state system.
Unable to reconcile their differences on reforms for the dying federal system, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats,
Bosnians and Macedonians returned to their respective republics and began to politically organize
themselves along ethnic, rather than policy lines. The failure to resolve the immediate issues of the
federation signified the end of secular party politics in Yugoslavia.
Both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches actively pursued similar goals of restructuring from
the remains of the once-inclusive Yugoslav identity an exclusionary, ethnically congruent model
around their respective belief systems. As the Yugoslav system began to crumble, the elites of both
confessions took advantage of the social vacuum left behind by the failing Communist ideology of
‘Brotherhood and Unity.’ Both churches have labored mightily to get close to a 100 percent fit
between religion and ethnic identity among Serbo-Croatian speakers and have tended to reinforce
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The 1963, 1969 and 1974 constitutional augmentations provided broad concessions of autonomy to
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nationalism.26 In relationship to nationalist identity formation, the churches are indeed both militant
and national and, ironically, reinforce each other, as will be seen below. 27

The Serbian Orthodox Church
Perhaps the most central principle in the Serbian Orthodox Church (hereafter SOC) is its
perception as the sole defender of Orthodoxy against Islam’s expansion from the East and
Catholicism’s from the West. Ideologically, the SOC offers itself as the underpinning of traditional
national security and the center of national life.28 Several historical events have left permanent
impressions on the SOC’s ecumenical identity and are therefore crucial in examining its contribution to
identity formation: the Battle of Kosovo (1389); war crimes committed against Orthodox Christians
during the Nazi occupation of Croatia (1941-1945) and the participation of Archbishop Alozije
Stepinac; a nation-wide increase in ethnic tensions beginning in the late 1970’s in Kosovo; the
Memorandum published by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; and finally, the SOC’s support
of the authoritarian Milosevic regime.
The SOC and its links to the Serb nation lie in the historical origins in the southern-most Serb
province of Kosovo. The historical defeat of Prince Lazar’s forces at the hands of the advancing
Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo serves as one of the most significant historical pillars for Serbian
ethnic identity and the SOC. On 28 June 1389 Turk forces engaged Prince Lazar at Kosovo Polje
(Field of the Blackbirds).29 Unable to secure support from the peoples of Central and Western Europe,
the superior Ottomans handily defeated Prince Lazar’s rag-tag army and beheaded him. Instead of
reciting the legend as a military defeat, the Battle of Kosovo represents a badge of honor for Serbs. 30
The Ottoman’s would rule for five centuries with the Serbs regaining independence only in the second
half of the 19th century (1878) and the SOC reestablishing its autocephalous status in 1920. 31
The events of World War II strengthened the SOC’s image as defender of its flock, especially
those living outside the borders of Serbia proper.32 The Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia ended the
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Yugoslav monarchy under King Alexander I. The German 14 th Tank Division entered Zagreb to
rapturous cheers. On 10 April 1941, Croat Minister of the Armed Forces Slavko Kvaternik proclaimed
the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzhava Hrvatska, hereafter NDH).33 Waving the
traditional red-and-white checkerboard flag, the NDH would embark on a policy to categorically
eradicate undesirables from its society: Serbs, Jews and Roma.34 Although the NDH and its Ustasha
leader Ante Pavelic only lasted as long as Nazi Germany, it attempted to establish a singularly Catholic
Croatia by enforced conversions, deportations, and mass extermination. 35
Despite conflicting stories of his relationship to Pavelic and Croatian fascism, many historians
cite Archbishop of Zagreb, Alozije Stepinac (1898-1960), as having played an instrumental role in the
expulsion and maltreatment of Croatia’s non-Catholic population. Instead of promoting restraint and
understanding toward other religions in Croatia, Stepinac generally supported the intentions of the
Ustasha. On 28 April 1941, a pastoral letter was read from all Catholic pulpits calling on the clergy
and faithful to collaborate in the work of their leader, Pavelic. 36 Other local religious leaders,
particularly the Franciscan order, fervently took up the message and offered their services in the mass
killings and conversion of Orthodox ‘schismatics.’
Archbishop Stepinac referred to these mass conversions in several letters as “a good occasion
for us to help Croatia to save the countless souls.”37 In his own diary, Stepinac writes
The most ideal thing would be for the Serbs to return to the faith of their fathers;
that is, to bow the head before Christ’s representative, the Holy Father. Then we
could as last breathe in this part of Europe, for Byzantinism has played a frightful
role in connection with the Turks.38

significant numbers in all the Yugoslav republics outside of Serbia proper, i.e. Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Alex Dragnich claims on page 11 in
Yugoslavia’s Disintegration that roughly 40% of all Serbs lived outside the confines of ‘narrow
Serbia.’
33
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While the exact number of NDH victims is still hotly debated (Croat sources claim 60,000 were
exterminated, while Serbs offer figures of approximately one million), there is sufficient information to
assume a large-scale and systematic removal of non-Croats.
Toward the end of the 20th century, Kosovo’s historical importance resurfaced as tensions
between the majority Muslim Albanians and minority Serbs intensified. Due to the Albanian
population explosion and the exodus of Serbs beginning in the 1970’s, the SOC warned about the
Albanian menace.39 SOC bishops from New Zealand, Europe and the Americas formulated an appeal
entitled ‘The Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church Against the Genocide
Inflicted by the Albanians on the Indigenous Serbian Population, Together with the Sacrilege of Their
Cultural Monuments in Their Own Country,’ which contained lists of rapes, murders and the
desecration of Orthodox places of worships.40 This publication acted as a request for improved
government protection against vandalism of their religious shrines and hostility toward Serbs and
Orthodox clergy.41
The already precarious situation for both Serbs and Albanians was further enhanced as SOC
leaders and intellectuals regularly issued charges of planned genocide perpetrated against Serbs,
without any attempt to align its allegations with its internationally accepted definition.42 Obviously, it
is quite difficult to assess the accuracy of such allegations. Nevertheless, such publications from the
SOC certainly strengthened Serb resolve not to give up Kosovo and produced a powerful antiAlbanian feeling among Serbs.43
Six years after Tito’s death, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereafter, SANU)
published a pamphlet simply known as the Memorandum. Although mostly devoted to a calm
assessment of Yugoslavia’s economic travails and to promoting the kind of centralizing solutions
favored by Yugoslav integrationists, the SANU Memorandum did contain venomous attacks of the
persecution of Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia.44 It claimed that despite their great sufferings on behalf of
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Yugoslavia, they were the most exploited and victimized during the Communist period.45 This message
was ravenously circulated up by the media and received staunch support from the SOC and an
undistinguished, but successful LCY apparatchik: Slobodan Milosevic.46
On 24 April 1987 Milosevic was sent to assess the situation in the Serb enclave of Kosovo
Polje. After listening to ethnic Serbs complaints of suffering and mistreatment, Milosevic infamously
guaranteed members of the Serb minority that no one had the right to beat the people (niko ne sme da
bije narod!).47 By quickly offering its support to the Milosevic regime, the SOC attempted to advance
legitimate national, cultural and religious rights that were suppressed under Communism. 48 They
perhaps did not realize that they entered into Faustian partnership with a despot.
The SOC sponsored a program in 1989, which, instead of calming the already stressed
relations between ethnicities in other republics, caused greater destabilization. The six-hundred-yearold bones of Prince Lazar, borne from monastery to monastery with the media close behind through all
the areas inhabited by Serbs, not only established the quasi-territorial claims for the ethnic Serb state,
but also re-awakened days of glory as the first medieval state formed in Southeastern Europe, as if
1389 were yesterday.49
Due to 45 years of strict exclusion by the atheist Communists, the SOC leadership leapt at the
chance to regain its lost stature among its believers by placing itself behind Milosevic’s authoritarian
policy. In a deceptive counter-reaction, Milosevic actively mobilized the SOC to amplify his future
aims. The ultimate conflation of Church and state leaders, the exaggerated allegations of genocide
against Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia and the SOC’s historic role of defending Serbdom took place in
1989 at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Milosevic was able to present himself as
the man who has reversed the defeat of 1389 and reclaimed the Serbs heartland for the ‘nebeski
narod:’ the heavenly nation.50 Surrounded by a group of black-robed Serb Orthodox bishops and
facing huge crowds, starved of the romance of history and of contact with religion during Tito’s rule,
Milosevic declared, in a fiery speech, that Serbdom “after six centuries was confronting battles they
are not armed, though that cannot yet be excluded.”51 Soon after Kosovo’s status as a virtually
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autonomous republic was revoked and replaced with JNA and Federal police units to quell any further
Albanian demonstrations.
Powerful religious symbolism continued to be transmitted by the media and directly affected
public awareness. The SOC held an immense posthumous funeral in August 1991 for three thousand
victims of the World War II genocide, whose bones were removed from ten caves in Herzegovina
following nine months of exhumations.52 The funeral was televised live throughout Serbia. Lines of
coffins were stretched for one and a half kilometers as the patriarch of the SOC sung the liturgy, with
speeches held by leading nationalist intellectuals and politicians.53 Such actions by the SOC blurred
the division between politics and religion.
By 1992 a low-level war in Croatia threatened to spread. Media repression in Belgrade and
the situation in Kosovo were also on the increase. By this time several leaders of the SOC, primarily
Patriarch Pavle I, had realized that the dictatorial practices of the Milosevic regime could cause more
harm than good to its interests in remaining a strong social factor. A defining event was the Belgrade
regime’s adamant refusal to recognize the results of citywide elections held in 1992. Such acts of
arrogance, combined with draconian UN economic sanctions placed on Yugoslavia, helped to
convince the SOC to change its supportive relationship toward the Milosevic regime. It organized and
participated in several immense anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade and other major cities
throughout the 1990’s.
Despite the vociferous criticisms against the increasingly oppressive regime, other SOC
leaders ironically refused to renounce their support of other leading nationalist figures. In the Serb
entity of Bosnia, for example, indicted war criminal and former Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan
Karadzic, enjoyed considerable support. He regularly made public his links to the SOC and its positive
influences on his decision-making.54 In a Montenegrin publication, Svetigora, Dr. Karadzic,
considering himself the personal defender of his people and faith, was quoted as saying:
God graced me to do something in my life that is significant, so significant that I
think it was worth being born, live and die to help my people. God gave me good
health. It is only difficult to make a decision, then I ask many people, even children,
and even more importantly we ask our Church. Not a single important decision was
made without our Church.55
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The shift in support came to late and by the early 1990’s the stage had been set for violent conflict in
Croatia and Bosnia. By manipulating the ancient sentiments of defeat and victimization from the
Kosovo legend and the more recent atrocities against Serbs by Croat fascists in World War II, the SOC
masterfully mobilized large numbers of people to realize their shared historical experiences. In this
manner it reversed what was considered so detrimental under Tito’s secular rule: the state-imposed
marginalization of religion. Because the single-party system began to experience massive social
challenges to its legitimacy, the church elites saw an opportunity to reassert its lost importance. By
initially linking itself to Milosevic’s rise to power and solidifying support from the regime, the SOC
narrowed the gap between church and state. Serb ethnicity and Orthodoxy were successfully fused into
a more narrowly defined identity.

The Roman Catholic Church of Croatia
Many authors claim that the SOC made the largest contribution toward the Serb nationalist
build-up in Yugoslavia. Contrary to this perspective, one finds little differentiation between the actions
of the SOC and the Catholic Church in Croatia (hereafter, the Church) and the representation of their
respective ethnic nation. Detailed inspection demonstrates that the Church bears considerable
responsibility for inciting nationalism among its believers and reinforcing insecurity among nonCatholics.
During the recent secessionist war and, to a lesser extent, in Titoist Yugoslavia, several
actions implemented by the Church indicate its contribution to the development of ethno-religious
nationalism. Firstly, its interpretation of and unwillingness to offer any message of atonement for
World War II atrocities perpetrated against Serbs, Jews and Roma infuriated non-Croats. Additionally,
the Church’s relentless exoneration of Archbishop of Zagreb Stepinac from any participation in war
crimes did little quiet latent fears. Secondly, its alignment with President Franjo Tudjman’s rightwing,
nationalist party prior to and after the 1990 multi-party elections added further suspicions of its
intentions. Lastly, the Church’s utilization of symbolism and historical parallels reawakened the
nightmares of fascist World War II Croatia. These decisions blurred the line between the Church and
Tudjman’s authoritarian state and failed to pacify non-Croat’s legitimate historic fears.
The outbreak of World War II hostilities in the Yugoslav lands brought vile atrocities. War
crimes, however, were also conducted by the occupying German army, as well as the Royalist Chetnik
divisions from Serbia and Tito’s Partizan force, who massacred thousands of Ustasha regulars and
Croatian Domobrani (Home Guard).56 Without revisiting the topic, I shall hereby only mention that the
nature of World War II atrocities strongly influenced perceptions during Communist rule and after the
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1990 multi-party elections. These perceptions severely hampered reconciliation between the SOC and
the Catholic Church, as we shall see below.
The Cold War saw West Germany, especially under Chancellor Willy Brandt, apologize to
the millions of victims for the heinous acts of the Nazis. This moral dimension was best symbolized by
Brandt’s gesture of dropping to his knees at the site of the Warsaw Ghetto during a 1970 visit to
Poland.57 West Germany did not attempt to offer revisionist explanations of its involvement in World
War II. Reconciliation with its past and improved relations with its Eastern neighbors under Brandt’s
Ostpolitik required of West Germany to admits its implication in the horrors perpetrated by its sons
and asked for forgiveness from Jews and other victims around the world.
The Church in Croatia showed little willingness to express such regret for the massacres
against Serbs, Jews and Roma, in which a number of Catholic clergy were directly culpable.58 Indeed,
there is only one documented case of a Catholic official offering an apology. Bishop Pihler in 1963 did
issue a statement asking Serbs and others for forgiveness.59 In the tense atmosphere prevalent in the
late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the SOC emphatically requested the Church leadership to condemn the
events of World War II.
During communism, Catholic officials regularly declared the figures offered by Serbs as
propaganda. Catholic bishops have reacted by minimizing the number of casualties inflicted, claiming
that many Croats were killed as well.60 The concentration camp at Jasenovac and in other areas,
according to Croat calculations, exterminated only a maximum of 60,000 persons. Figures taken by
German soldiers stationed along side Croat forces produced numbers of 350,000 missing and 20,000.61
Even if we accept the Church’s calculations, would not at least some official statement of regret be
appropriate? After all, there were numerous attempts of forcible conversion from Orthodoxy to
Catholicism and such an act is ecclesiastical and repentance would be in order.62 The simplest
atonement would have drastically improved the strained relations with the SOC long before the recent
hostilities began. It presumably would not have reinforced the SOC’s rhetoric of victimization and
mistreatment of Serbs in other republics in the 1980’s and 1990’s.
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Enhancing the Church’s World War II interpretation was its vigorous protection of
Archbishop Stepinac against all criticism. The promotion for sainthood by the Church created
international outrage, most visibly among Orthodox believers and Jewish victims in Israel. Again, if
we were to assume that Stepinac was not directly involved in executions, his well-documented
approval of the Croatian episcopate to actively undertake forced conversion of Orthodox to
Catholicism deserves stern condemnation. By not recognizing, much less celebrating the fragile
religious patchwork that was Yugoslavia, the Church’s consistent revisionist stance on World War II
had a considerable destabilizing effect on the region and incited nationalist tendencies among Serbs.
This acted like a spiral, reinforcing Croat nationalism leading up to the post-1990 period.
The first multi-party elections were held throughout Yugoslavia in 1990. The nationalist,
rightwing party Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica), won control of
the Croatian parliament, the Sabor, on 30 May and elected former Communist and historian, Franjo
Tudjman, as its president.63 The Church demonstrated unlimited support for the new regime and
advocated its main objective: secession from the federation. The Church leadership was well
represented at the opening of the Sabor sessions; politicians and clergy did not fail to use photo
opportunities in order to be seen together in the media and much was done to reinforce the unity of
church, nation and state.64
With its immediate endorsement of the HDZ, the Church became the quasi-official amplifier
of independence and sovereignty, depicting its as a reward to the Croatian people for thirteen centuries
of loyalty to Rome.65 A 1992 article published in the popular Catholic magazine Veritas, author Josip
Beljan leaves little doubt about the Church’s relationship to the state:
God has, by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked after his faithful
people; spoke on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle, warring
together with his people for their liberation. God returned to the entire mass media,
political, social and state life of Croatia, from where He was driven out forty-five
years earlier. The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, Croatian bishop
next to Croatian minister of state. Present at masses in churches are officers and
Croatian soldiers. Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks. This was truly again
a real war for the honored cross and golden liberty, for the return of Christ and
liberty to Croatia; here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian land but a
war between good and evil, Christianity and Communism, culture and barbarity,
civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred. Thank
God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics. 66
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Under Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, the Church further unified its policy with that of the HDZ.
For example, the Church supported the exclusive usage of the Croatian language rather than SerboCroatian.67 Upon unseating the Communist Party of Croatia, Tudjman decreed the immediate removal
of all signs in the Cyrillic script (i.e. monasteries, places of worship, Orthodox schools, village names).
Representing approximately 14% of Croatia’s population, Serbs interpreted this decree as a restriction
of cultural expression and the erasure of evidence of Serbs historical presence. 68
Symbolism and historical parallels played a major role in the reinforcement of nationalist
perceptions. The HDZ leadership, much like the Church, quickly dispelled any doubts about its
interpretation of World War II events. Disregarding victim’s historical experience, the Tudjman
regime reinstated symbols harking back to the World War II period. One such move was the
reintroduction of the red and white checkerboard flag or Shahovnica, which flew next to the Nazi
Hakenkreuz. In 1990 it was proudly displayed in front of administration buildings and places of
worship. The British war journalist covering the war, Anthony Loyd, encountered such symbolism in
the Bosnian-Croat town of Tomislavgrad:
Ante Pavelic himself gave me the stiff-armed salute from a large photograph
[hanging on the wall immediately facing the door]. Various smaller pictures, brownedged with age, showed his Croat NDH troops in German coal-scuttle helmets that
carried a large U center-pinned by a cross on their front: Ustasha. Swastikas, Sieg
Heils and Wehrmacht helmets. These were still the symbols of gas chambers and
goosesteps.69
Additionally, the Tudjman regime brought back the World War II anthem, Lijepa Nasha (literally, Our
Beauty). Such decisions would be the modern equivalent of Germans wearing the World War II Iron
Cross, singing Deutschland Uber Alles while crossing into present-day Poland or the Czech Republic.
By the early 1990’s, Church elites, particularly Cardinal Kuharic, began to distance itself
from the nationalist policies of the HDZ. The Church was quite pleased with the defeat of the atheist
communist regime; however, its successor became increasingly repressive toward the media and any
other parties challenging its authoritarian rule. Kuharic publicly revealed, “the Church would guard its
autonomy and respect the autonomy of state authority, as well as adopt a critical attitude toward public
authority where it is necessary.”70 The Church recognized the possible risks in remaining a political
appendage of the HDZ’s hyper-nationalism and, therefore, opted for an arms-length policy.
In the end, the Church experienced similar success as the SOC. It, too, succeeded in leaving
behind its prior marginalized position under communism and developed an influential role in politics.
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Indeed, the Church was able to create a congruent ethnic identity with religion at its center. By
supporting nationalist policies toward the erasure of Serb cultural and linguistic marks, the Church was
able to create an exclusionary image of the ‘other.’

Conclusion
Reviewing the actions of the SOC and the Church in Croatia, one realizes that the violent
breakdown of Yugoslavia was not a clash between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Rather, the actors
employed concepts of nationalist identity formation along confessional lines with the ultimate goal of
ethno-religious congruency.
Massive social changes worked to the advantage of both communities and to the most
unfortunate disadvantage of Yugoslavia. The deteriorating economic situation, the rise in
unemployment and faults of Tito’s one-party system, coupled with the waning of Communist
secularization, produced the necessary social vacuum for such nationalism. Thus, an atmosphere
promoting competition between elites evolved and both churches intended to profit from this longawaited opportunity to re-establish their social position.
The SOC and the Church masterfully utilized symbolism to support the realization of their
goals. The SOC’s re-activation of the mysticism of Kosovo and re-enforcement of the massive World
War II atrocities suffered at the hands of the Pavelic regime created a concise center around which its
observers began to orient themselves. It clarified the delineation between Serb and Croat by ascribing
collective blame to the Croats, thus intensifying the markers of separation.
The Church in Croatia brought up its brutal World War II collaboration with little collective
regret. Its deliberate failure to offer any form of atonement for the heinous acts of genocide was
instrumental in instilling the historic fear among the Serbs and the SOC of yet another round of forced
conversions. This reinforced the SOC’s mentality of victimization and defender of the Serbian
Orthodox flock. The uncontrollable cycle of identifying the other set into motion the formation of an
exclusionary identity.71
Both parties successfully achieved multi-symbol congruence. The patriarchs of both faiths, in
particular Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic, made strong efforts to link themselves to the
emerging nationalist regimes. Although they would eventually realize the brutality of their respective
allies and, consequently, attempted to distance themselves, their initial support created a solid
foundation upon which particular identities could be constructed. By doing so, they made the division
between politics and religion virtually unrecognizable.
70
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The Church in Croatia mobilized other forms of symbolism, such as supporting the HDZ’s
Croatian-only language policy and flying the history-laden Shahovnica. The SOC’s posthumous
services on live television and the procession of Prince Lazar’s bones throughout Yugoslavia certainly
convinced many observers that Serbs intended to expand their state. These were, indeed, powerful
forms of symbolism and produced great internal unification among their respective believers, while
instilling fears in others.
Although a reduced Yugoslavia has emerged as ethnically, linguistically and religiously
diverse as ever, despite violent attempts to join Serb lands in a ‘Greater Serbia,’ Serb ethnicity still
tends to imply membership to Eastern Orthodoxy. Through its own brutal military campaigns, notably
the 1995 Oluja

and Blejsak offensives, Croatia has emerged as a largely mono-ethnic, mono-religious state. Thus,
Croat ethnicity is inseparably tethered to Roman Catholicism.
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